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Abstract—Generating keys and keeping them secret is critical
in secure communications. Due to the “open-air” nature, key
distribution is more susceptible to attacks in wireless commu-
nications. An ingenious solution is to generate common secret
keys by two communicating parties separately without the need
of key exchange or distribution, and regenerate them on needs.
Recently, it is promising to extract keys by measuring the random
variation in wireless channels, e.g., RSS. In this paper, we propose
an efficient Secret Key Extraction protocol without Chasing down
Errors, SKECE. It establishes common cryptographic keys for
two communicating parties in wireless networks via the real-
time measurement of Channel State Information (CSI). It out-
performs RSS-based approaches for key generation in terms of
multiple subcarriers measurement, perfect symmetry in channel,
rapid decorrelation with distance, and high sensitivity towards
environments. In the SKECE design, we also propose effective
mechanisms such as the adaptive key stream generation, leakage-
resilient consistence validation, and weighted key recombination,
to fully exploit the excellent properties of CSI. We implement
SKECE on off-the-shelf 802.11n devices and evaluate its perfor-
mance via extensive experiments. The results demonstrate that
SKECE achieves a more than 3× throughput gain in the key
generation from one subcarrier in static scenarios, and due to its
high efficiency, a 50% reduction on the communication overhead
compared to the state-of-the-art RSS-based approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are susceptible to various attacks due to
the “open air” nature of the wireless communication [22].
Cryptographic key establishment is a fundamental require-
ment for secure communication to support confidentiality
and authentication services. However, it is difficult to ensure
availability of a certificate authority or a key management
center in dynamic wireless environments [4]. It is necessary to
have alternatives for key agreement between wireless entities
in a common channel [12] [14] [2].
One recent trend in this regard is to use physical-layer iden-
tification [16]. For example, received signal strength (RSS)
becomes a popular statistic of the radio channel and is used
as the source of secret information shared between two parties
[11]. The variation over time of the RSS, caused by motion
multipath fading, can be quantized and used for generating
secret keys. Due to presence of noise and manufacturing
variations, the generated secret keys might be different, which
are corrected by information reconciliation. Finally, privacy
amplification is introduced to convert this bit-string into a
uniformly distributed string to make it secure enough.
However, RSS cannot work well in stationary scenarios
due to infrequent and small scale variations in the channel
measurements. To address this issue, we propose a secret
key extraction based on the inherent randomness of wireless
channels. In current widely used IEEE 802.11n networks, data
is modulated on multiple Orthogonal Frequency Division Mul-
tiplexing (OFDM) subcarriers simultaneously. Each network
interface card (NIC) of the device can get a value of Channel
State Information (CSI) which describes the current condition
of the channel in each subcarrier [1].
Different from RSS, CSI is a fine-grained value derived
from the physical layer. It consists of the attenuation and phase
shift experienced by each spatial stream on every subcarrier
in the frequency domain. In contrast to having only one
RSS value per packet, NIC can obtain multiple CSI values
at one time. CSI provides other attractive properties. First,
it is very sensitive to location such that two closely-placed
receivers have very different readings by the same sender.
Second, its readings of a pair of sender and receiver have
a strong correlation. Third, it presents an excellent quality
of randomness. Due to these characteristics, CSI is an ideal
resource for secret key extraction.
In this paper, we present the design and implementation
of CSI-based Secret Key Extraction without Chasing down
Errors. SKECE exploits channel diversity to generate secret
key using CSI. The contributions of this work are summarized
as follows.
1. We first give an insight into how CSI measurements
improve the effectiveness and safety of secret key extraction
based on extensive real world measurements. Our observation
suggests that CSI possesses excellent symmetry in channels,
sensitivity to the environment, and rapidly decorrelates over
a distance, which can work well in both static and mobile
scenarios, and effectively prevent the predictable channel
attack. Moreover, it can be measured from multiple subcarriers
simultaneously, which significantly improves the rate of key
generation.
2. We propose an efficient and secure consistency vali-
dation method. It avoids leaking any available information
to attackers, when two parties check the consistency of the
generated bit streams. Additionally, it has a high precision
rate of consistency validation.
3. We creatively propose a weighted key recombination.
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2This method can efficiently recombine the mismatched bit
streams into a consistent stream for two parties without
detecting which bits are mismatched. It reduces the communi-
cation overhead while enhancing privacy and security by fully
exploiting the special properties of OFDM modulation.
4. We evaluate SKECE through various experiments using
off-the-shelf 802.11 devices in real indoor and outdoor sce-
narios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 presents real world
observations on 802.11n devices and the adversary model.
The design of SKECE is elaborated in Section 4, followed by
performance evaluation in Section 5. We conclude the paper
in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Encryption and authentication on communication between
two parities in wireless networks is helpful for privacy and
sensitive data protection [22] [24] [23] [13]. Extracting a
shared secret key from the observation and processing of radio
channel parameters has been proposed to address this problem
without resorting to a fixed infrastructure.
Typical secret key generation process consists of three
phases: randomness exploration, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification [15]. In the randomness exploration,
quantization is used to convert measurement values to infor-
mation bits. A good quantizer can maximize the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob without information leakage.
An algorithm is proposed in [11] to find such a quantizer. The
information reconciliation process uses either error correcting
codes [5], or interactive information reconciliation protocols,
e.g. Cascade [3]. The universal hash functions are widely
adopted in [17], [19], [10] to enhance privacy and security.
There are also many works on exploiting physical channel
randomness feature to generate secret key [21], [9], [7]. The
authors in [16] discuss the condition of generating secure keys
and propose a solution to extract a secret key from unauthen-
ticated wireless channels using channel impulse response and
amplitude measurements. The authors in [11] summarize the
processes needed for key extraction, give their choices of the
methods in every process, and conduct extensive experiments
to show the properties of RSS in real environment.
It can also be exploited for device pairing [8] and authen-
tication [20]. Extracting secret keys over MIMO has been
introduced in [18].
Previous works are mainly based on RSS, a coarse indicator
of signal. As a fine-grained indicator of channels, CSI draws
increasing attentions It can be measured using off-the-shelf
802.11n devices. In this paper, we suggest that the channel
randomness can be further exploited through the channel
diversity offered by CSI to efficiently extract secret key.
III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION AND ATTACK MODELS
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a
method of Multicarrier Modulation. OFDM divides previous
single-carrier into a set of orthogonal sub-carriers, which
Fig. 5. Alice walks freely to measure CSI values from 90 subcarriers
simultaneously using a network card with 3 antennas.
can convert one rapidly modulated wideband signal to many
slowly modulated narrowband signals. Channel state informa-
tion (CSI) describes the current channels condition, which
can reveal the effect of scattering, fading and power decay
with distance. 802.11n protocol provides 30 pairs of amplitude
and phase information out of 56/114 sub-carriers. Each pair
of amplitude and phase describes the state information of
a sub-carrier. The available CSI can reflect the environment
influences on the signals transmitted from transmitter(s) to
receiver(s):
Y = HX +N (1)
H = Y/X = hejw
where X is transmit signal, Y is received signal, N is the
noise, H is the CSI: the channel response at the receiver in
frequency domain, h and w is the amplitude and phrase.
Utilizing off-the-shelf 802.11n wireless net card, CSI can
be collected. It reports the channel matrices for 30 subcarrier
groups, which is about one group for every 2 subcarriers at
20 MHz or one in 4 at 40 MHz. Although the driver does
not directly provide functions to get CSI, there are some open
source tools on Linux platform that can be used to collect CSI.
We use Linux 802.11n CSI Tool and Intel 5300 wireless net
card to spread out the signal received by one antenna and to
provide 30 pairs of amplitude and phase CSI values to each
antenna [6]. Since 802.11n supports MIMO, Fig. 1 shows the
CSI measurements from three antennas of one NIC.
In our experiments, we setup one laptop (named Alice)
to connect to the other laptop (named Bob). To establish a
shared secret key, Alice and Bob should measure the variation
of the wireless channel at the same time. However, typical
commercial wireless transceivers are half duplex, i.e., they
cannot transmit and receive signals simultaneously. We use
ping command to guarantee the time between two directional
channel measurements is small enough. The initiator requests
the receiver to immediately reply once receiving order. The
round-trip delay is always between 1ms-5ms. Another laptop
(named Eve) is introduced to overhear the packets delivered
between Alice and Bob and measure the CSI variation. Our
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Fig. 1. Multiple readings for CSI measurements from 30 subcarriers
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Fig. 4. Variations of CSI in different locations
observations for the feature of CSI is extracted into following
4 subsections.
A. Reciprocity of Radio Wave Propagation
The multipath properties of a radio channel at any point are
identical on both directions of a link. Figure 2 and Figure 3
shows the CSI values in static scenario and mobile scenario. It
is easy to see that Alice and Bob have similar CSI variations.
B. Temporal Variations in the Radio Channel
Figure 2 shows that CSI value is constantly changing over
time in static scenario. That is because the multipath channel
changes caused by any motion of people or objects in the
environment near the link.
C. Spatial Variations
The properties of a radio channel are unique to the locations
of the two endpoints of the link. Figure 4 shows that Eve at a
third location will measure a different CSI. This assertion is
supported by the well-known Jakes uniform scattering model,
which states that the received signal rapidly decorrelates over
a distance of roughly half a wavelength, and that spatial
separation of one to two wavelengths is sufficient for assuming
independent fading paths.
D. Multiple Subcarriers of CSI
IEEE 802. 11 a/g/n adopt OFDM to provide high through-
put. In OFDM, a channel is orthogonally divided into multiple
subcarriers. Figure 5 shows the multipath fading on a mobile
radio channel reflected in 90 subcarriers. Measurements from
multiple subcarriers can significantly improve the key gener-
ation rate.
TABLE I
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Symbol Definition
a, b Alice, Bob
m the number of subcarriers (m = 30 in our system)
Bai a bit stream of Alice generated from her i-th subcarrier
Kai a matched key of Alice generated from her i-th subcarrier
K′ai a mismatched key of Alice generated from her i-th subcarrier
E. Adversary Model
For easy of exposition, we summarize our adversary model
as follows:
• An adversary Eve can listen to all communications be-
tween legitimate users.
• Eve can also measure channels between herself and other
parties anywhere she wants all the time.
• Eve is free to set intermediate objects between two parties
to affect their channels and derive some patterns known
only to her.
• Eve knows the key extraction algorithm and parameters
settings.
• Eve cannot prevent or modify any messages transmitted
through the channel.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our CSI-based secret key extraction consists of three
components: adaptive bit streams generation, leakage-resilient
consistency validation, and weighted key recombination. For
ease of presentation, Table I lists the symbols and notations
used in this paper.
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Fig. 6. Timing diagram for SKECE
A. Adaptive Bit Streams Generation
To establish a shared secret key, Alice and Bob measure
the variations of the wireless channel between them over
time by sending probes to each other and measure the CSI
values. Ideally, Alice and Bob should both measure the CSI
values at the same time. However, typical commercial wireless
transceivers are half duplex, i.e., they cannot transmit and
receive signals simultaneously. Thus, Alice and Bob can only
measure the radio channel in one direction at a time. As long
as the time between two directional channel measurements is
much smaller than the change rate of channel, they will have
similar CSI variations.
1) Converting the channel measurements to bits: Alice and
Bob must convert their respective sequences of channel estima-
tion (i.e., the amplitude of CSI Sa(t1, ..., tn) and Sb(t1, ..., tn))
into identical bit-strings (0-1 sequences Ba and Bb) to be used
as cryptographic keys. The bit-string should be (1) Sufficient
long, ranging from 128 bits to 512 bits being the length of
keys commonly used in symmetric cipher and (2) Statistically
random, resilient to statistical defeats that could be exploited
by attackers.
Many quantization methods have been proposed in previous
works. For example work in [2] partitions the CSI measure-
ments to multiple parts and performs quantization in every
parts.
The quantizer we used is described as follows. (i) Alice
and Bob calculate two adaptive thresholds q+ and q− inde-
pendently such that q+ = µS(t1,...,tn) + α ∗ σS(t1,...,tn) and
q− = µS(t1,...,tn) − α ∗ σS(t1,...,tn), where µ and σ are the
mean value and standard deviation of S(t1, ..., tn), α ≥ 0.
(ii) Alice and Bob parse their CSI measurements and drop
CSI estimates that lie between q+ and q− and maintain a list
of indices to track the CSI estimates that are dropped. They
exchange their list of dropped CSI estimates and only keep
the ones that they both decide not to drop. (iii) Alice and Bob
generate their bit streams by extracting a “1” or a “0” for
each CSI estimate if the estimate lies above q+ or below q−,
respectively.
B. Leakage-resilient Consistency Validation
Alice and Bob extract the bit streams from the CSI mea-
surements they collect using quantizers. There might be some
differences in the corresponding bits between two streams.
They arise due to three factors: presence of noise and interfer-
ence, manufacturing variations, and the half-duplex mode of
communication between transceivers.
It is crucial for Alice and Bob to validate the consistency
of their bit streams without exposing available information to
the channel that can be overheard by Eve.
One-way function is one that is easy to compute on every
input, but hard to invert given the image of a random input.
One-way function is ideal for Alice and Bob checking the
consistency of keys without revealing information to malicious
users. We use SHA-1 to hash the bit streams, which is highly
secure and most widely used of one-way functions.
Alice sends the SHA-1 hash results (Ha1, ...,Ham) of her
bit streams to Bob, where m is the number of subcarriers.
Bob hashes his bit streams in the same way, and compares the
result with Alice’s value. The same hash results indicate the
same original bit streams and vice versa. The same bit stream
is thereby used as the secret-key, denoted as Kj . On the other
hand, the different bit streams need to be corrected, denoted
as K ′ai and K
′
bi, respectively.
However, SHA-1 produces a 160-bit message digest. Di-
rectly transmitting it may incur high communication cost.
Fortunately, SHA-1 has the following feature: even a small
change in the message will, with the overwhelming probability,
result in a completely different hash. Due to the avalanche
effect, it can be considered that for two different bit streams
even if only one bit is different, each bit in the SHA-1 hash
values will have 50%-50% chance of being different.
Due to this feature, it is unnecessary to verify entire hash
values of two bit streams. Checking a small portion of hash
values may have a high probability to find the difference
between two different bit streams. The relationship between
checking length r and the correct probability γ can be de-
scribed as follows:
1− (1
2
)r ≥ γ (2)
r = dlog1/2 (1− γ)e
In our system, we set r = 6 to achieve above 98%
correctness checking of detection results.
C. Weighted Key Recombination
If the bit streams extracted from all m subcarriers are
mismatched, they cannot be used as the secret key. In this case,
we perform reconciliation to extract a consistent bit stream for
Alice and Bob based on m extracted bit streams.Traditional
information reconciliation techniques (e.g. the error correcting
code and interactive information reconciliation) should first
exclude matched bits to shrink the parts of the streams
containing mismatched bits using parity checking or Hamming
distance. The two parties permute their bit streams randomly,
5divide the stream into blocks, and check the parity of each
block. If the parity is different between two sides, they repeat
above procedure using a binary search until the size of blocks
is so small that attempting to replace a few bits may correct
the mismatch bits.
In contrast, using CSI can generate m bit streams from m
subcarriers and most bits of each stream are consistent as
we have seen in Section III. We thereby propose a weighted
key recombination method. The key idea is very simple. We
just let Alice and Bob randomly pick up bits from the m
bit streams and recombine them into two new bit streams
Bar and Bbr without exchanging any information. Alice
and Bob random select the bits in same positions from the
corresponding bit stream. The newly generated bit steams
have high probability to be matched. Alice and Bob check
the bit stream via consistency validation. If Bar is unequal to
Bbr, they will recombine the key again. The following two
components realize our method.
1) Difference degree detection: Difference degree detection
estimate how different the two bit streams K ′ai and K
′
bi are.
Alice generates a random number X , and obtains the editor
distance dai between K ′ai and X . Then she sends (da1,...,dam)
and X to Bob. Bob compares its distance dbi with dai.
The difference d˘i between dai and dbi reflects the difference
between K ′ai and K
′
bi. A larger d˘i implies more difference
between K ′ai and K
′
bi.
Since Alice and Bob always generate very similar bit
streams, d˘i is quite small in most situations. The value modulo
dai and dbi are enough to detect the difference of editor
distances of two parties. We use d′ai instead of dai to compute
the distance as follows:
d′ai = dai mod θ (3)
d˜′i = |d′ai − d′bi| (4)
Choosing appropriate θ can reduce the communication cost
and avoid leaking too much information to the adversary Eve.
In our experiment, we set θ = 5.
2) Secret key recombination: Assume we randomly pick li
bits from K ′ai and K
′
bi to generate the new bit stream, the
probability that all those li bits are matched in K ′bi is
Pr
i
(li) = (1− dˆi
L
)(1− dˆi
L− 1) · · · (1−
dˆi
L− li ) (5)
where L is the length of the key, dˆi is the actual number
of mismatched bits between K ′ai and K
′
bi. Thus the overall
probability to successfully generate a matched bit stream of
length L within k rounds is
1−
(
1−
m∏
i=1
Pr
i
(li)
)k
We introduce a weight ωi to decide how many bits should
be selected from each one of m bit streams. The weight of
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Index Status Distanceae Environment
A Static 1.5 m Indoor,
B Static 3 m Indoor, Complex
C Mobile 3 m Indoor
D Mobile 10 cm Indoor
E Static 10 cm Outdoor
F Mobile 3 m Outdoor, Complex
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF DATASETS
each bit stream is computed as follows:
ωi =
θ − d˜′i∑m
j=1(θ − d˜′j)
(6)
Then, the number li of bits picked up from bit stream Bi
used to recombine a new bit stream is
li = dL ∗ ωie. (7)
Indeed, d˜′i is proportional to dˆi, the value of ωi implies a
match quality of two corresponding bit stream Bai and Bbi.
Following Equation 7, SKECE picks more bits from those
streams with more matched bits between Alice and Bob.
V. EVALUATION
We conduct our experiments in a wide variety of environ-
mental settings and under different scenarios. The configura-
tion is described in Section 3. In our experiments, there are
six scenarios as shown in Table II.
Scenario A: Alice, Bob, and Eve put their laptops on a
boardroom table in a meeting room. Alice and Eve are 1.5m
apart. It’s a quiet room without subject moving.
Scenario B: Alice, Bob, and Eve stay in an office. Alice
and Eve are 3m apart.There are various electronic devices and
some walking people in the room.
Scenario C: Alice, Bob, and Eve are in a meeting room.
Alice and Eve remain still separated with a distance of 3m.
Bob walks freely in the room.
Scenario D: It is similar to scenario C, except that Alice
and Eve are 10cm apart from each other.
Scenario E: Alice, Bob and Eve stay in a garden. Alice and
Eve put their laptops on one bench separated with a distance
of 10cm. Bob’s laptop is put on the other bench.
Scenario F: Alice, Bob and Eve walk freely on crowded
street. Alice and Eve keep a 3m distance from each other.
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Fig. 9. Measurements while walking in a meeting room
A. Converting the Channel to Bits
As mentioned before, α affects the performance of bit
streams extraction from CSI measurements. Figure 7 shows the
impact of α in scenario C. For ease of description, we divide
the bits into three kinds: ignored, mismatched and matched.
An ignored bit is the dropped bit whose value ranges from q−
to q+. A mismatched bit is the one extracted as “1” in one
party and extracted as “0” in the other party. A matched bit
is the one that two parties agree upon.
We investigate the variation of three kinds of bits extracted
from 300 probes by increasing α from 0 to 1. Obviously, a
smaller α improves the rate of bits generation but increases
the mismatched bits ratio as well. With a larger α, fewer bits
can be extracted, while the mismatched bits ratio reduces.
Specifically, the bit error should be carefully deal with. If
the sequence Bai is different from Bbi even by a single bit,
then the two bit streams cannot be used as cryptographic keys.
As a result, two parties must reconciliate with each other. High
probability bit error will increase the difficulty on information
reconciliation. Therefore, we prefer to choose a larger α to
keep low mismatched bits ratio.
However, a too large α will seriously influence the rate of
bits generation. It is a fundamental trade-off in the selection
α that affects the rate and the probability of error in opposing
ways. An appreciate α can reduce the mismatched bits ratio
at acceptable of key generation. From the figure we can see
that α greater than 0.4 can reduce the bit errors to 0. In our
experiment, we set α = 0.4 in mobile scenarios and α = 0.7
in static scenarios.
B. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is a major concern from
both the performance and security perspectives, because the
eavesdropper can overhear all communications among legiti-
mate users. We measure the number of messages transmitted
between Alice and Bob in each reconciliation process for
SKECE and a typical RSS based approach, Cascade used in
[3], [11].
In the simulation, both Alice and Bob have 30 different bit
streams, and each stream has 300 random bits for SKECE.
For Cascade, both the parties have one bit stream with 300
random bits. We randomly set 1 to 3 bits mismatched between
two sides on their corresponding streams. We then measure the
number of transmitted messages for achieving consistent 300
bits. Note that the number of bits for reporting differences
in the reconciliation is very small, e.g. 1 bit used for parity
checking plus several noise-padding bits or 6 bits for SKECE.
The length of data field in the message packet is much
shorter than other fields, e.g. preamble 32 bytes, address
6 × 3 bytes. Thus, the dominated communication overhead
of reconciliation processes lies on the amount of delivered
messages.
Figure 8 reports the comparison between two approaches.
Clearly, SKECE outperforms Cascade. For SKECE, more
than 80% cases need no more than 10 messages to achieve
the consistence, while Cascade needs to deliver at least 20
messages in most rounds. This is because that SKECE exploits
the excellent properties of CSI to utilize the matched bits to
recombine the bit stream instead of adopting time-consuming
detection and correction mechanisms in the reconciliation
process. The result indicates that SKECE can reduce
50% communication overhead and benefit the efficiency
improvement a lot.
C. Mobile Endpoints
Considering that the mobility is an inherent property of
wireless networks, we evaluate the performance of key extrac-
tion in scenario D. Figure 9 compares the channel estimation
of CSI with that of RSS in a meeting room.
The channel often varies with a wide variation window both
in CSI (17dB to 30dB) and RSS (-55dB to -42dB). Alice and
Bob have a high degree of reciprocity. This experiment shows
that the mobility in indoor setting helps achieve fast secret key
extraction from the channel measurements, which increases
the inherent entropy of the measurements and improves the
reciprocity of the channel.
It is also interesting to see that Eve’s observation is quite
different from Alice’s and Bob’s in CSI while she obtains
some similarities with Alice and Bob in RSS. That is because
CSI has more decorrelation over a distance.
D. Static Endpoints
We conduct our experiment in static indoor and outdoor
scenarios B and E as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
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Fig. 10. Measurements in an office
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Fig. 11. Measurements on the playground
Test A B C D E F
Frequency 0.73 0.57 0.84 0.38 0.12 0.75
Longest run of ones 0.32 0.11 0.16 0.88 0.67 0.21
FFT 0.60 0.73 0.95 0.34 0.79 0.68
Approx. Entropy 0.58 0.89 0.60 0.61 0.09 0.17
TABLE III
NIST STATISTICAL TEST SUITE RESULTS
Figure 10(b) and Figure 11(b) show the variations of RSS
measurements in an office and on the playground respectively.
The channel variation in static scenarios are less noticeable
than those in mobile scenario. We also note that the curves for
Alice and Bob do not follow each other, indicating a channel
with low reciprocity. This happens because the variation in
a static channel is primarily caused by environment distur-
bance and hardware differences which are non-reciprocal. RSS
measurements in this type of environment contain very low
inherent entropy.
Figure 10(a) and Figure 11(a) shows the variations of CSI
measurements collected in an office and on the playground
respectively. Though Alice and Bob have different CSI values,
their variations trends are similar. The result demonstrates
that CSI significantly outperforms RSS on key generation
in static scenarios. On one hand, CSI is more sensitive to
environmental changes than RSS. On the other hand, CSI
has a better correlation on channel estimation.
E. Randomness of Key
Guaranteeing that the generated bits are random is crucial
for key generation. Since we have assumed the adversary
possesses a complete knowledge of our algorithm, any non-
random process in the bit sequence can be leveraged by the
adversary to reduce the time-complexity of cracking the key.
For example, if there are always more “1”s than “0”s in bit
stream, then the effective search space for the adversary would
be reduced. Consequently, a variety of statistical tests have
been proposed to test for various defects.
The p-value from each test is listed in Table III. To pass a
test, the p-value for that test must be greater than 0.01. We
find that the bit streams generated from CSI pass all the tests.
F. The Correlation of Generated Key between Alice and Eve
The randomness test results indicate whether SKECE is
secure to defend the key from crackers. It’s crucial for us
to make sure whether Eve can generate the similar key from
its channel measurements.
We evaluate the correlation of generated key between Eve
and Alice in different scenarios. The most familiar measure of
dependence between two quantities is “Pearson’s correlation”.
It is +1 in the case of a perfect positive linear relationship
(correlation), −1 in the case of a perfect decreasing (negative)
linear relationship (anticorrelation). As it approaches zero,
there is less of a relationship.
We use Pearson’s correlation to estimate the independence
between Eve and Alice in scenarios B, D, and E as shown
in Figure 12. All the values are between −0.15 and +0.15
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Fig. 15. (a) Predictable variations of the RSS values, (b) A magnified portion of the traces.
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Fig. 16. (a) The variations of the CSI values, (b) A magnified portion of the traces.
for 30 subcarriers in all three scenarios. The result indicates
that Eve’s keys are always independent from Alice’s key,
even though Eve is 10cm apart from Alice in scenario D.
It is because that the received signal rapidly decorrelates
over a short distance. Since he observes a nearly independent
channel, it is impossible for Eve to crack the key from the
multipath fading channel used by Alice.
G. Independence of Bits of 30 Subcarriers
We extract secret-key based on CSI measurement from 30
subcarriers. The correlation of 30 bit streams of subcarriers
concerns whether all these bit streams can be used as secret-
key.
We also evaluate the correlation using Pearson’s correlation.
The bit streams are generated in scenario C.
Figure 13 plots the correlations among all 30 subcarriers.
All the correlations are always between −0.3 and +0.3
except the correlations with themselves. It states that the key
extracted from 30 subcarriers is independent. OFDM encodes
digital data on multiple carrier frequencies. These sub-carrier
signals are orthogonal with different frequencies. They have
the different channel responses at the receiver in frequency
domain. The extracted bit streams from 30 subcarriers are
independent with each other, all of which can be used as
secret-keys simultaneously.
H. Rate of Key Generation
An important quantity of interest is the rate of generating
secret bits, expressed in secret-bits per second or s-bits/sec.
Naturally, it is desirable that Alice and Bob achieve a high
secret-bit rate. According to 802.11 recommendations, it is
generally desirable for master keys to be refreshed at one hour
intervals.
Figure 14 compares the rate of key generation from CSI
9and RSS measurements in scenarios A, C, E, and F. It is easy
to find that the rate of key generation from CSI is nearly 4
times higher than RSS in scenario A, and is more than 6 times
higher in scenario C.
In order to facilitate the comparison, Figure 14 only shows
the mean of key generation rate of 30 subcarriers. Infact, the
key generated from CSI is the sum of all the subcarriers.
Thus, the rate of key generation is thirty-fold the mean
value. The rate of key generation from CSI is 32 times
higher than RSS in mobile scenarios, and 100 times higher
in static scenarios.
I. Predictable Channel Attack
As mentioned earlier, stationary environments reduce the
variation of the channel. An intelligent adversary can use
deliberately planned movements in such scenarios to produce
desired and predictable changes in the channel between the
actual sender and receiver.
We conduct an experiment to emulate the predictable chan-
nel attack in the meeting room. Alice and Bob are separated
by 3m, they keep still and probe the channel to generate the bit
streams at 10Hz frequency. Eve periodically blocks the line-
of-sight transmission between Alice and Bob. The distance
between Alice and Eve is around 1m.
Figure 15 shows the variation of the RSS values. The
RSS values display periodical changes with the transfer of
time. The RSS drops when Eve block the line of sight path,
and then picks up when Eve move away. The pattern of
variation follows the movements. In this scenario, it produces
a predictable pattern of secret bits from RSS measurements.
Figure 16 shows the variation of the CSI values. Though its
change also displays periodicity, the variation of bit streams
is still random, which is unpredictable. It is because CSI is
more sensitive to environment and it will be changed by any
variations of different environmental factors. As long as the
attacker at a third location is more than a few wavelengths
from either endpoint, it will not produce a predictable
pattern of secret bits from CSI measurements.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a protocol, called SKECE, that
exploits the reciprocity of the transfer function of the wireless
multipath channel to establish a common secret key between
two communicating entities. Our protocol obtains a security
advantage from the fact that the channel is random and the
response decorrelates rapidly over distance, which can defend
against a passive eavesdropper as well as an active adversary
attempting predictable channel attack.
We also present the results of a thorough effort to exper-
imentally validate the feasibility of the wireless channel for
secret key generation. We used off-the-shelf 802.11n cards
for collecting CSI measurements. SKECE generates secret bits
at a high rate from 30 subcarriers both in static and mobile
scenarios. It adopts a weighted key recombination algorithm
to obtain a consistent bit stream without chasing down the
mismatched bits, once all the 30 pairs of bit streams are
inconsistent. It reduces the communication overhead by 50%.
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